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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
by
Robert T Brousseau*
HE survey year included a session of the Texas Legislature, which
enacted a number of changes of substance to the Workers' Compensation Act.' These new provisions are summarized in part III
of this Article. As in the past, a significant number of the appellate cases
handed down during the period were decided on grounds of legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. These cases do not repay reading in the
majority of instances. An earlier survey author noted the wisdom of the
Amarillo2 court of appeals in holding such opinions at considerable
distance.
I.

A.

SUBSTANTIVE LAW

The Employment Relation. Borrowed Employees

The courts of appeals handed down only two significant decisions treating the employment relation during the survey period. 3 Both cases involved questions of borrowed, or colloquially, "loaned" employees. Carr
v. Carroll4 is a thorough and traditional treatment, in the context of a third
party action, of an increasingly common phenomenon involving temporary employment services.
Austin Carr was an employee of Manpower, Inc., a supplier of temporary labor. On the day of the accident Manpower assigned him to work as
a "general carrier" at the place of business of the Carroll Company. Carr
spent the morning unloading trucks. He was injured when he fell from the
front prong of a fork lift and was pinned under the machine. Manpower's
carrier paid compensation. Carr sued Carroll for damages for the personal
injury he sustained as a result of the negligence of Carroll's employees.
Readers of compensation cases will observe that this case is an instance of
* B.S.F.S., Georgetown University; J.D., Duke University; LL.M., Columbia University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; of Counsel, Stutzman & Bromberg,
Dallas, Texas.
1. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306-8306a (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1984).

2. Muldrow, Workers' Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 323,
355 (1980) (quoting International Ins. Co. v. Torres, 576 S.W.2d 862, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1978, writ refed n.r.e.)): "We conclude that many cases can be cited pro and con on
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a jury finding of total and permanent disability. We respectfully refrain from undertaking the impossible task oi attempting
to reconcile all of these cases."
3. Two other cases dealt with highly specialized employment questions.
4. 646 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ retd n.r.e.).
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the "upside-down" case where the employee argues against compensability
in order to obtain the larger recovery available in a third party tort action,
while the employer's liability carrier argues in favor of compensation in
order to obtain the immunity that accompanies a finding of the employment relation.
A jury found that Carr was Carroll's borrowed employee at the time of
the injury and that Carr and Carroll Company were each fifty percent negligent. On the strength of the first jury finding and proof that Carroll
Company was a subscriber under the Workers' Compensation Act, 5 the
trial court entered a take-nothing judgment against Carr. On appeal, the
Dallas court of appeals affirmed use of the familiar "right of control" test
6
explained by the supreme court in Producers Chemical Co. v. McKay.
The court rejected Carr's suggestion that the trial court should have instructed that "though an employee be loaned [sic] and subject to the direction of the temporary employer, no new employment relationship is
established if in following the directions of the temporary employer Carr
was doing so merely in obedience to his general employer."'7 The court
instead found Hilgenberg v. Elam 8 controlling and stated that the test for
determining whether one has become the employee of another is
"'whether in the performance of the wrongful act he continues liable to
the direction and control of his general employer or becomes subject to
that of the person to whom he is lent.' " The court used this test, however,
for a purpose for which it was not designed. Hilgenberg was a tort case,
and the test it developed asks whether it is just for the special employer to
be liable to a third party victim in tort. To use this test in a case where the
plaintiff is the victim ignores the very real differences between the two
types of suits and the differing policies that underlie tort law and compensation law.
The court placed some emphasis on whether the borrowed employee's
acts were within the normal scope of the special employer's business, with
the customary attention to the special employer's supervision of the details
of the work. 10 The court rejected Carr's contention that the special issue as
5. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1984).
6. 366 S.W.2d 220, 225-26 (Tex. 1963). The McKay court stated:
Whether general employees of one employer have . . . become special or

borrowed employees of another employer is often a difficult question ....
Solution of the question rests in right of control of the manner in which the

employees perform the services necessary to the accomplishment of their ultimate obligation. If the general employees of one employer are placed under
control of another employer in the manner of performing their services, they

become his special or borrowed employees. If the employees remain under
control of their general employer in the manner of performing their services,
they remain employees of the general employer and he is liable for the consequence of their negligence.
Id. at 225, cited in Carr, 646 S.W.2d at 563.
7. 646 S.W.2d at 563.
8. 145 Tex. 437, 198 S.W.2d 94 (1946).
9. 646 S.W.2d at 564 (quoting Hilgenberg, 145 Tex. at 441, 198 S.W.2d at 96) (emphasis supplied by Carr court).

10. 646 S.W.2d at 564.
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to borrowed employee status should have required the jury to find that
Carr had consented to or was charged with knowledge of the lending
agreement. I It distinguished an earlier case, 12 which seemed to have so
held. As a general proposition, the earlier opinion was probably correct,
for if compensation is premised upon a statutory surrender of common law
rights through the medium of the contractual employment relation,' 3 then
the employee should be aware of whose employment he has entered.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals held that the instruction need not be
given.' 4 The court noted that in any event the record revealed that Carr
was aware that his employer was a supplier of temporary labor and that
Carroll Company was to supervise his performance.'
The court's line of reasoning in Carr could extend too far unless the
policies of the Act are considered. The compensation scheme is designed
to replace tort with compensation as between employer and employee as to
employment-related injuries. Everything else is a gloss on this simple
principle. In Carr it appeared that Carr's daily employment was by its
very nature to work for two employers, and that therefore he had consensually forfeited his common law tort rights in favor of a statutory compensation remedy under article 8306, section 3(a).16 Both employers would be
liable in compensation, and contractual indemnity would ordinarily allocate ultimate financial responsibility between the two carriers.
Dickerson v. IN.A.17 also illustrates the difficulty in using tort precepts
in compensation cases. Dickerson was an employee of the general employer, Barton. At the time of the accident that injured him, Dickerson
was driving a truck leased from Barton to R.B. Goodloe, I.N.A.'s insured,
who operated it under a permit from the Texas Railroad Commission.
The lease, filed with the Texas Department of Public Safety as required by
article 6701c-'118 of the Texas statutes, provided: "Lessor . .. hereby
gives lessee . . . full power, control, supervision, and use of the above described equipment. . . in the manner as though lessee owned same during
the term of this lease."' 19
I.N.A. moved for summary judgment on the basis of Dickerson's deposition testimony that he was an employee of Barton and not of R.B. Goodloe. Dickerson contended, however, that he was an employee of R.B.
11. Id.
12. Guerro v. Standard Alloys Mfg. Co., 566 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cited in Carr, 646 S.W.2d at 564. In Guerro the general employer
visited the job site several times to check on the employees and give instructions. In addition, the injured worker spoke only Spanish and the special employer did not speak Spanish.
566 S.W.2d at 102. Such close supervision did not occur in Carr. 646 S.W.2d at 564.
13. An employee of a subscriber is deemed to have waived his right of action at common law unless he gives the employer written notice he is claiming common law rights at the
time of the contract of hire. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 8306, § 3a (Vernon 1967).
14. 646 S.W.2d at 564-65.
15. Id. at 565.
16. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 8306, § 3(a) (Vernon 1967).
17. 640 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ).
18. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701c-1, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
19. 640 S.W.2d at 82.
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Goodloe by virtue of article 6701c-1, section 2, and an earlier case that
held that a Railroad Commission permit holder was not permitted to deny
that it had the right to control the driver. 20 The trial court granted the
carrier's motion for summary judgment and the court of appeals affirmed. 21 The court of appeals distinguished the precedent as addressing
concerns of respondent superior rather than compensability. Public policy
considerations differ where the driver is the active tortfeasor rather than
himself the injured party. The court stated that article 6701c-1 " 'was
obviously enacted to eliminate any uncertainty that might otherwise exist
as to who is responsible for wrongs inflicted upon the public at large
through the operation on our state highways by lessees of the vehicles
named in the statute.' "22 Thus the statute had nothing to do with the
question of a driver's employee status under the Workers' Compensation
Act. Because the statute did not affect his employee status, Dickerson's
Barton's employee was sufficient to supdeposition testimony that he 2was
3
port the summary judgment.
B. Course of Employment
Five highly significant opinions were announced in the crucial area of
course of employment, including one lengthy and problematic opinion by
the Texas Supreme Court. A trend toward compensability may be discernible, especially in the area known as "going and coming."
Unexplained Death. The supreme court's 1981 decision in Deatherage v.
InternationalInsurance Co .24 was thought by some commentators to have
created a presumption that a fatal accident arose out of the course of employment unless evidence indicated that the decedent was not carrying out
his employer's business at the time of his death.2 5 During the survey year,
the court made clear in Walters v. American States Insurance Co.26 that
this interpretation overstated its earlier holding. Walters established new
guidelines for cases of unexplained death, or at least for death cases resulting from unexplained assaults.
20. Greyhound Van Lines, Inc. v. Bellamy, 502 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1973, no writ). In Greyhound a third party sued Greyhound when the driver of a leased
truck negligently started the truck, injuring the third party. The court rejected the lessee's
argument that a lease giving Greyhound exclusive possession, control, and use of the truck
did not include the right to supervise the driver's use of the truck. 502 S.W.2d at 588.
21. 640 S.W.2d at 84.
22. Id. (quoting Greyhound, 502 S.W.2d at 588).
23. 640 S.W.2d at 84.
24. 615 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. 1981) (jury could reasonably infer that night watchman who
lived on premises of abandoned plant was performing a security duty for employer whenever he was on the premises, such that employee's death in unwitnessed fire that destroyed
his trailer was the result of injuries received in the course of his employment), on remand,
628 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, no writ) (insufficient evidence that fire risk was
reasonably incidental to employee's work). For a discussion of the case, see Collins & Ramon, Workers' Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J. 239, 242-43 (1983).
25. T. FLAHIVE & R. OGDEN, TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION MANUAL 112 (1982).
26. 654 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1983).
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The employee in Walters, Ivan Michael Justice, was an interior designer
for Richard Lamport & Associates, Inc. He and Lamport were found shot
to death in a field near the Dallas-Fort Worth airport. The men had been
shot in the back, apparently from a distance. There was evidence that
Lamport had had an appointment at the airport and had asked Justice to
accompany him. There was also evidence that an unknown customer had
called Lamport repeatedly.
The trial court submitted a "simple special issue" 27 and definition to the
jury:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Ivan Michael
Justice received his fatal injury in the course of his employment, as
that term [is] defined in this charge . . . ?
"Injury in the Course of Employment" as that term is used in this
charge, means any injury having to do with and originating in the
work, business, trade or profession of the employer, received by an
employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or
business of28 his employer, whether upon the employer's premises or
elsewhere.
The jury returned an affirmative finding, but the court of appeals found
"no evidence" supporting the finding and reversed. 29 In seeking reversal,
the plaintiff argued that there was evidence to support the finding and that
she was entitled to a presumption that Justice's death was employmentrelated. The supreme court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Pope, agreed
that the evidence
supported the finding, but characterized the presumption
30
as unneeded.
The difficulty in deriving the full meaning of the Walters opinion stems
in part from the failure of the carrier's counsel, noted by the majority, to
plead, prove, or obtain an issue on the statutory exclusion by article 8309,
section 1, of injuries resulting from purely personal assault. 3' The court
stated:
The jury was not instructed and there was no way for the jury to know
that there was a statute that declared Justice was not an employee if
his death was caused by an "act of a third person intended to injure
him and not directed against him as an employee, or because of his
employment." Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8309, § 1. Nobody requested such an instruction. The jury's function was to answer the
them
[single simple] issue. They did that and we should not charge
32
with knowledge of a statute about which they knew nothing.
27. Id. at 425.
28. Id.
29. American States Ins. Co. v. Walters, 636 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982).
30. 654 S.W.2d at 425.
31. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967) provides that injury in the
course of employment does not include "[ain injury caused by an act of a third person
intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to him and not directed against
him as an employee, or because of his employment."
32. 654 S.W.2d at 427.
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Walters seems to hold that in the total absence of proof that the deaths
resulted from a purely personal assault, it was a permissible inference from
facts similar to the ones in Deatherage that the employee's fatal injury occurred in the course of his employment. 33 As the concurring justices observed, however, the majority's "permissible inference" went a great deal
farther than the facts Deatherage required, too far perhaps. The concurrence in Walters observed that it was a reasonable inference
that Justice was engaged in and about the furtherance of Lamport's
business; i.e., that Justice received his fatal injuries during the hours
of his employment and was at a place where he might have properly
been ...
This does not end our inquiry, however. There must also be evidence that Justice's injury was of a kind and characterthat originated
in Lamport's
business; i.e., that Justice was not killed for personal
34
reasons.
In this case, the concurring opinion persuasively asserted, the inference
was too great. That two men were killed on a business trip in no way
demonstrated that the actual source of the injury was employment-related.
The majority met this objection with references to Larson's positional risk
doctrine, 35 as if that doctrine made the inference itself more permissible.
Of course, the Larson theory supports the inference, but only in a limited
appellate sense. "No evidence" reversals on similar facts will now be
fewer. Larson apparently intended only to shift the "neutral risk" of unexplained death to the employer where proof of course of employment existed. In most jurisdictions course of employment is an administrative
finding; the jury finding overlay is peculiar to Texas. A presumption, as
suggested by the concurrence, that an employee's death by assault occurring at the time and place of employment was work-related would be logical, helpful, and consistent with Larson's positional risk theory.
Travel and Going and Coming. Four cases within the survey period treated
the "geometric" aspects of course of employment, and three of those dealt
with variations on the going and coming rule. As a starting point, the general rule is that the benefits of the workers' compensation statute do not
apply to injuries one receives while traveling to and from work. 36 Texas
adds a statutory dimension to this general proposition, incorporating it
into article 8309, section lb of the Act. 37 Thus, as the supreme court held
33. Id. at 426-27.
34. Id. at 429-30 (McGee, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
35. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 11.33 (1982), cited in
Walters, 654 S.W.2d at 426. The doctrine states that if an assault occurs for which no explanation exists and no evidence connects it to the employee privately, then the claimant should
receive compensation if he was exposed to the assault because he was discharging his duties.
I A. LARSON, supra, § 11.33.
36. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Rodriquez, 645 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1982, writ ref d n.r.e.); see infra notes 44-46 (discussion of case).
37. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb (Vernon 1967) provides:
Unless transportation is furnished as a part of the contract of employment or
is paid for by the employer, or unless the means of such transportation are
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in Texas GeneralIndemnity Co. P. Bottom ,38 it is necessary to demonstrate
that the injury was of a kind and character that had to do with and
originated in the work of the employer, that the injuries were received
while the employee was furthering the business of the employer, and that
transportation was furnished as a part of the employment or paid for or
was directed to travel
controlled by the employer or that the employee
39
from one place to another by the employer.
United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Brown 40 illustrates the interplay of
these requirements. The court in Brown affirmed a summary judgment for
the widow and surviving daughter of a registered nurse killed en route to a
hospital assignment. The decedent was employed by Homemakers of
Waco, a provider of health care personnel to hospitals, and routinely
worked assignments in four to six hospitals in several towns and cities.
Nurses placed by Homemakers were not required to report in to Homemakers but traveled directly to their assignments. Homemakers charged
the client hospitals twenty-four cents per mile for employee travel and reimbursed the employee twenty cents per mile. The court of appeals found
all the elements of recovery conclusively established, relying specifically
on the reimbursement for transportation and on the fact that the employee
was "directed in his employment to proceed from one place to another. '' 4'
The court rejected the going and coming rule sub silentio in such a case,
stating that applying the rule here "would be wholly unjust to salesmen,
servicemen, repairmen, deliverymen, and a host of others who may be required to use their own automobiles in their work, and would be a strict
rather than a liberal interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation
of the
Act."' 42 The court distinguished Brown's work situation from that
43
ordinary employee who travels each day to a specific location.
Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Rodriguez" contains a thorough discussion of the going and coming rule and a notable exception to it called the
access doctrine. The access doctrine provides that when the employer "has
under the control of the employer, or unless the employee is directed in his
employment to proceed from one place to another place, such transportation
shall not be the basis for claim that an injury occurring during the course of
such transportation is sustained in the course of employment. Travel by an
employee in the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer shall not
be the basis for a claim that an injury occurring during the course of such
travel is sustained in the course of employment, if said travel is also in furtherance of personal or private affairs of the employee, unless the trip to the place
of occurrence of said injury would have been made even had there been no
personal or private affairs of the employee to be furthered by said trip, and
unless said trip would not have been made had there been no affairs or business of the employer to be furthered by said trip.
38. 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963).
39. Id. at 352-54; see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chestnut, 539 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (injury compensable under Act where employer
paid employee per mile for travel to and from jobsite; citing Bottom).
40. 654 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.-Waco 1983).
41. Id. at 568.
42. Id. at 568-69.
43. Id.
44. 645 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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evidenced an intention that the particular access route or area be used by
the employee in going to and from work, and where such access route or
area is so closely related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated
as a part of the premises, the general rule does not apply. ' 45
In Rodriguez a seamstress employed on third floor premises was injured
when she fell on metal stairs descending from a ground floor loading dock
extension while leaving her work. Employees habitually, but not necessarily or exclusively, used the loading dock as an access route to the third
floor place of employment. Together with other evidence of proximity and
employer and employee use, the court of appeals found this evidence both
legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's findings that the claimant was within the course and scope of her employment at the time of her
46
injuries.
A variation on the going and coming rule is the rule of Marks v. Gray4 7
developed by Cardozo to deal with cases in which travel is motivated in
part by business reasons and in part by personal reasons. This rule, which
exists in statutory form in Texas, 48 entered the court's decision in American
States Insurance Co. v. Caddell,4 9 although the court's use of the rule unnecessarily complicated a routine case. In Caddell the decedent, a businessman, was directed by an apparently controlling shareholder having
supervisory authority over him to travel to Waco to obtain plans. There
was some evidence that Caddell in fact went to Waco. He died later in the
afternoon in an automobile collision on a route whose path was not only a
direct route from his office to his home but also a direct route from Waco
to his home. The court began a coming and going analysis and mentioned
the conditions under which injury occurring during travel is compensable
under article 8309, sections 1 and lb.5 0 After leapfrogging over the provision allowing a finding of course of employment "when the employee is
directed in his employment to proceed from one place to another place," 5'
the court undertook a dual purpose analysis under section lb and Marks v.
Gray. This dual purpose or "mixed motive" analysis was unnecessary
since, as the court observed, "there is no evidence that the trip was made
for reasons other than business, there being no evidence or indication that
decedent's trip to Waco and back was for any personal or private motive."'52 The court therefore affirmed the trial court on the basis of no
evidence. A simpler "going and coming" analysis would have provided
the same result.
45. Id. at 538 (citing Texas Compensation Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 519 S.W.2d 630, 631
(Tex. 1974)).
46. 645 S.W.2d at 536.
47. 251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 181, 183 (1929).
48. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb (Vernon 1967); see supra note 37 (text of
statute).
49. 644 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
50. Id. at 885-87.
51. Id. at 887 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb (Vernon 1967)).
52. 644 S.W.2d at 887.
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Off-Duty Peace Officer. In what it termed a case of first impression, the
Dallas court of appeals in Vernon v. City of Dallas 53 affirmed a summary
judgment against an off-duty police officer who was injured in an altercation outside of the city that employed him. The court held that even on the
"scant evidence" in the summary judgment record, it was established as a
matter of law that Officer Vernon did not receive his injury while acting as
an employee in the course and scope of his employment. 54 The court relied heavily on a "jurisdictional" analysis, drawn from both the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Conduct of the Dallas Police
Department, to define the course of his employment for workers' compensation purposes by his jurisdiction as a peace officer, which the court found
to be the city of Dallas. 5" The court rejected without citation authorities
from other jurisdictions that may suggest broader tests of course of employment for peace officers. 56 The court also refused to overturn the summary judgment merely on the ground that the plaintiff was on call twentyfour hours a day. 57 The court noted the requirement of Thomas v. Travelers Insurance Co.58 that even an employee who is on call twenty-four
hours a day must make "the additional showing that he was injured while
engaged in or about the furtherance of his employer's business or affairs."'59 One wonders how much the court's opinion was influenced by the
qualms that moved it to add a footnote stating: "Plaintiff has maintained
in the trial court and here that he was acting to 'subdue an offender' or to
'end the disturbance.' This characterization is central to his argument. .

.

. Nothing in the record, except plaintiffs bare assertion, sup-

ports such a characterization.
C

' 60

Occupational Disease

Only two opinions appeared during the survey period concerning occupational disease. In Home Insurance Co. v. Davis6 1 the court of appeals
found the evidence factually insufficient to support a jury finding that
62
claimant Davis contracted chronic bronchitis as an occupational disease.
As with all factual and legal insufficiency cases, there is some hazard in
extrapolating beyond the evidence before the appellate court. It is useful,
nonetheless, to note the court's statement of the claimant's burden in an
occupational disease case. The claimant must produce "probative evidence of a causal connection between the claimant's work and the disease,
i.e., the disease must be indigenous to the work, or must be present in an
53. 638 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
54. Id. at 8.

55. Id. at 7-8 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 6.05, 6.06 (Vernon Supp. 1984)
(referring to peace officer's county)).
56. 638 S.W.2d at 7-8.
57. Id.
58. 423 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967, writ refd).

59. 638 S.W.2d at 9-10.
60. Id. at 7.
61.

642 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ).

62. Id. at 269.
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increased degree in that work as compared with employment generally. 63
The claimant must also show the injury did not result from "[a]ggravation,
'64
acceleration, or excitement of a non-occupational disease."
In the other occupational disease opinion, Scott v. Houston Independent
School District,65 the court found no reversible error in the trial court's
refusal to include definitions of "harm" and "damages" in the jury charge
in addition to the definition of "injury. ' 66 The appeals court held that
"harm" and "damage" are not legal or technical terms but rather words to
be given their ordinary connotation or natural construction. 67 The claimant, a Houston school teacher, was hospitalized under the care of a psychiatrist for neurasthenia or, specifically, anxiety neuroses. She based her
right to recovery upon the 1971 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act, which added "repetitious physical trauma" to the occupational
disease statute. 68 The supreme court had previously held, however, in
Transportation Insurance Co. v. Maksyn69 that the amended statute excludes injury by repeated mental trauma. The plaintiffs definition of
"harm," 70 which the trial and appellate court rejected, arguably would
have broadened or permitted juries to broaden the definition of "injury"
beyond what the occupational disease statute and the court in Maksyn
intended.
D. Medical Provider's Cause of Action
The supreme court in Smith v. Stephenson 71 faced the competing economic interests of the unpaid health care provider and the injured claimant during the pendency of a workers' compensation claim before the
Industrial Accident Board and the courts. In Smith a chiropractor sued his
patient on a sworn account for his fee for services rendered in connection
with an injury that the chiropractor knew to be the subject of a compensation claim. The chiropractor had sent fee statements to the board, but
when a dispute arose before the board as to the amount of the fee he withdrew his claim from the Board and sued the patient. He received a judgment from the trial court, which the court of appeals affirmed. 72 The
supreme court reversed, holding that until the board processes a claim and
determines reimbursement for or payment of the employee's medical expenses, the health care provider may not pursue a private claim against the
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 641 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
66. Id. at 257. The court took its definition of "injury" from 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 20.01 (1970).

67. 641 S.W.2d at 258.
68. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp, 1984).
69. 580 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. 1979).
70. The plaintiff requested the following definition: "'Harm' with reference to a living,
active structure-as the body is-means essentially that the structure no longer functions as
it should."
71. 641 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1982).
72. 624 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Tex. App.-Waco 1981).
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employee. 73 The court stated, "Allowing the provider the right to file suit
prior to final determination by the Board, or by the courts if the board
award is appealed, would circumvent the principal purpose of the Act, to
protect the employee."' 74 Commenting on the adequacy of the statutory
protection for the provider, the court noted with approval Larson's statement of the general rule that "if it turns out that the claim was not compensable, and that the employee is to be ultimately liable for the fees, the
physician or hospital has been protected by a holding that the statute of
' 75
limitations is tolled during the pendency of the claim."
II.

A.

PROCEDURAL LAW

Exclusivity of Remedy

The supreme court wrote an intriguing but not definitive opinion in the
difficult area of exclusivity of remedy in Massey v. Armco Steel Co .76 The
Industrial Accident Board awarded Massey total and permanent compensation and the insurer, American General, appealed to the district court.
Massey answered and counterclaimed, alleging three causes of action,
which the court defined ambiguously. The first cause of action was Massey's right to recover against the insurer under the workers' compensation
policy. The court stated:
In his second and third causes of action Massey joined Armco [and its
agents] Lambright and Sansing [American General's employee]
claiming that they conspired to interfere with the settlement of his
compensation claim. Massey alleged a breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing owed under the contract of insurance and
77
sought damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The trial court granted summary judgment against the employee, and
the court of appeals affirmed on the ground that a workers' compensation
award was the employee's exclusive remedy. 78 The supreme court reversed and remanded on a technical point, 79 leaving several questions subject to continuing doubt. The court observed that while the Act bars an
employee's common law action for negligence against his employer, the
employee retains a cause of action for intentional torts. 80 This right of
action for intentional tort, however, is alternative to and mutually exclu73. 641 S.W.2d at 903.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 61.12(k), at
10-720 (1981)). The 1981 edition of this treatise is no longer in print. The cited passage

appears in I A. LARSON, supra note 35, § 61.12(l), at 10-721.
76. 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983).
77. Id. at 933.
78. 635 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982), rev'd, 652 S.W.2d 932
(Tex. 1983).
79. Massey failed to state a cause of action for civil conspiracy. See infra notes 83-84
and accompanying text.
80. 652 S.W.2d at 933 (citing Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex.
1980)).
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sive of a right to recover benefits under the Act. 8 1 An employee who collects benefits under the Act for intentional injury has thus elected his
remedy and is estopped from later seeking damages.
Significantly, the supreme court agreed with the injured employee that
an employee may have one claim against his employer under the Act and
another claim at common law for intentional tort. "Since such claims are
mutually exclusive, however, the employer's intentional act must be separable from the compensation claim and must produce an independent
injury."8 2
The court then examined Massey's pleadings to see if he had alleged an
intentional tort independent of the original claim for which the board had
awarded benefits. It found that he had not alleged such a tort, because his
intentional counts sounded in conspiracy and his allegation of conspiracy
was insufficient as a matter of law. 83 The court stated:
For liability to attach, there must be an unlawful, overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The only overt acts alleged by Massey are the
veto of his proposed settlements and the appeal from the award of the
Industrial Accident Board. Since the rejection of settlement proposals
act, Massey has not stated a cause of action for civil
is not an unlawful
84
conspiracy.
The court reversed the summary judgment, nonetheless, on the basis of
its well-known holding in Texas Department of Corrections v. Herring85
that a plaintiff must have an opportunity to amend a pleading that fails to
state a cause of action and that a special exception, not a motion for summary judgment, is the appropriate device to attack substantively deficient
pleadings.8 6 As the court stated in Herring, the "protective features of special exception procedure should not be circumvented by a motion for summary judgment .... ,,87 What this admonishment means is that a
claimant in Massey's position must be permitted to replead some other
intentional tort unrelated to the compensation claim. The court at one
point suggested that such claims should be limited to common law intentional torts,8 8 but did not expressly impose this limitation. The supreme
court thus left this important gray area of settlement practices concerning
compensation claims for resolution in other cases.
In one such case a court of appeals attempted to define this gray area. In
St. Paul Insurance Co. v. McPeak 89 claimant McPeak brought his claim to
the Industrial Accident Board and ultimately to the district court when the
insurer discontinued his benefits. In the district court he joined with his
action for workers' compensation benefits an action for damages under
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

652 S.W.2d
Id.
Id.
Id. at 934.
513 S.W.2d
Id. at 10.
Id.
652 S.W.2d
641 S.W.2d

at 933.

6 (Tex. 1974).
at 933.
284 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. 90 On its first hearing of the case the
court of appeals in its opinion and judgment made clear that the exclusive
remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act precluded recovery
under the Insurance Code, because it would "tip the balance" that the Act
had struck between employees' rights and employers' obligations. 9' To
hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would thwart the clear intent of the
legislature to limit the employee's recovery, and any deviation 92from that
limitation would threaten the public policy underlying the Act.
After listing a number of reasons why the trial court erred in trebling as
damages the benefits McPeak obtained in the compensation portion of the
trial, 93 the court squarely held that article 21.21 does not apply to a cause
of action under the Workers' Compensation Act.94 The court emphasized
the narrowness of its holding by stating what it had not held:
We are not to be read as holding that a cause of action for bad faith
settlement or other unfair insurance practices can never be brought
against a compensation carrier. .

.

. We also do not address whether

Article 21.21 applies to unfair claims or bad faith settlement practices,
or whether the violations claimed by appellant could be otherwise legally actionable. We simply hold the statutory remedies provided
under Article 21.21 do not apply to actions brought under the proviAct, and that the trial court erred
sions of the Workers' Compensation
95
in trebling the disability award.
On rehearing, the court determined that the trial court should have severed the Insurance Code claims from the compensation claims as authorized by rule 174(b) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 96 It then
rendered on the workers' compensation claim, affirming the claimant's
judgment, and reversed and remanded for a separate trial on the Insurance
97
Code claim.
A case of less potential influence in the realm of exclusivity of remedy is
Davis v. Houston Independent School District, 98 decided by the same court
of appeals that decided Massey and McPeak. In Davis the plaintiff, a
school teacher, was injured in attempting to quell a disturbance between
two students. She filed for and received compensation benefits. Later she
sued her employer for recovery of "assault benefits" provided for in the
90. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon 1981) provides that a person injured

by the unfair or deceptive acts or practices of a company engaged in the insurance business
may sue the company.
91.

641 S.W.2d at 286.

92. Id.
93. Id. at 287-88. Article 21.21 of the Insurance Code provides for treble damages as
well as injunctive relief. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon 1981).
94. 641 S.W.2d at 288.

95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 289. Rule 174(b) states: "The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party
claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims,
third-party claims, or issues." TEX. R. Civ. P. 174(b).
97. 641 S.W.2d at 289.
98. 654 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1983, no writ).
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school district's manual of administrative procedure. The assault policy
covered "unprovoked assaults" and left "injuries resulting from accidents"
to workers' compensation. The court held that the record contained no
conclusive proof of an election between mutually exclusive remedies or
that the same episode could not be construed as both an accident under the
workers' compensation law and an unprovoked assault under the contractual policy. 99 The court therefore was unable to say that plaintiff was estopped as a matter of law to assert the action under the assault policy.
On a subsidiary point, the court held that sovereign immunity for tort
did not protect the school district from suits for breach of contract, although sovereign immunity would shield it from the plaintiffs claim for
tortious interference with contractual advantage. 0 0 On the exclusivity of
remedy point, the court ruled in plaintiffs favor. The court stated, "appellees have not demonstrated how the provisions of the workers' compensation law works [sic] to preclude an employee's recovery for breach of
contract of employment; or how the contract in question provides that the
employee's exclusive remedy lies with workers' compensation."'' °0
B. Notice Requirements and Limitations
02
Notice of Injury andFiling of Claim. In Martinez v. Home Indemnity Co.'1
the Fort Worth court of appeals followed an earlier holding of the Beaumont court of appeals 0 3 that the first clause of article 8307, section 4a,
which states "unless the Association or subscriber have notice of the injury,"' 4 conditions only the requirement of formal notice of injury, not
the six-month period of limitation on the filing of a claim. 0 5 Thus, actual
knowledge by the employer or insurer does not toll the six-month limitation period.' 0 6 Moreover, the court rejected the claimant's contention that
she was entitled to the medical benefits incident to the injury even though
her weekly indemnity benefits were barred. The claimant premised her
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 821.
Id.
Id. at 822 (emphasis in original).
647 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).

103. Camarillo v. Highlands Underwriters Ins. Co., 625 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex. App.Beaumont 1981, no writ).
104. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967) provides:
Unless the Association or subscriber have notice of the injury, no proceeding
for compensation for injury under this law shall be maintained unless a notice
of the injury shall have been given to the Association or subscriber within
thirty (30) days after the happening of an injury or the first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease, and unless a claim for compensation with
respect to such injury shall have been made within six (6) months after the
occurrence of the injury or of the first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease; or, in case of death of the employee or in the event of his physical or mental incapacity, within six (6) months after death or the removal of
such physical or mental incapacity. For good cause the board may, in meritorious cases, waive the strict compliance with the foregoing limitations as to
notice, and the filing of the claim before the Board.
105. 647 S.W.2d at 104.
106. Id. The statute of limitations for filing of claims has since been extended to one

year. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
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argument on two cases seeming to hold that the only notice required to
entitle a claimant to medical expenses is the notice of injury. 0 7 Consistently with its holding as to wage benefits, the court held that what is true of
notice is not necessarily true of limitations. 10 8 The court relied upon Texas
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Beasley, 0 9 which held that a claim for medical
expenses merges with a claim for compensation and is barred with it.
Houston General Insurance Co. v. Vera 0 arose on an arguably erroneous instruction. The court asked the jury "whether notice was given and
the claim filed within the specified time periods after disability resulted."'
The critical event under the statute, however, is "injury or the first distinct
manifestation of an occupational disease."" 12 The court of appeals held the
carrier had waived the error under rule 274 by failing to object to the issue
at trial.1 3 It refused to treat the submission as fundamental error, on the
authority of De Anda v. Home Insurance Co. , 114 in which the supreme
court had tacitly allowed such a submission to stand." 5 On a no evidence
or insufficient evidence point, the court decided that the record contained
evidence that the foreman had actual knowledge of the injury and stated
6
that such knowledge met the statutory requirement." 1
Notice of Intent to Appeal. The supreme court took a strict view of the
twenty-day requirement for filing of the notice of intent to appeal' "7 in
American General Fire & Casualty Co. v. Weinberg." 18 The claimant filed
two notices, one in Austin on July 17, and a copy of the first in Dallas on
August 1. The claimant apparently filed the second copy in Dallas because he became worried that the Austin filing was ineffective since, although he had received his certified mail return receipt, he had not yet
heard from the board. On August 2 the board notified him of receipt of his
first notice. He filed suit fifteen days later on August 17, more than twenty
days after the filing of his first notice of intent to appeal. The carrier filed
an unsworn general denial and moved for summary judgment, which the
trial court granted. The court of appeals reversed on unassigned error.
The carrier, by failing to enter the verified denial required under rule
107. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Ratcliff, 537 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1976, no writ); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Simon, 474 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1971, no writ).
108. 647 S.W.2d at 105.
109. 391 S.W.2d 33, 40 (Tex. 1965) (on motion for rehearing), cited in Martinez, 647
S.W.2d at 105.
110. 638 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Ill. Id. at 105 (emphasis in original).
112. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967).
113. 638 S.W.2d at 105 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 274).
114. 618 S.W.2d 529, 533 n.4 (Tex. 1980).
115. 638 S.W.2d at 106.
116. Id.
117. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides that any
interested party not willing to abide by the final decision of the board must file a notice with
the board within 20 days of the final decision and must file suit within 20 days of giving the
notice.
118. 639 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. 1982).
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93(n), had forfeited the right to challenge late filing." 19 The court accordingly presumed the filing to have been timely, making summary judgment
0
inappropriate. 12
The supreme court reversed, describing its holding inartfully as resting
upon "fundamental error."' 2 1 According to the court, the court of appeals
should not have reversed the trial court's judgment on a point neither
party assigned as error.1 22 The court affirmed the summary judgment on
the ground of the claimant's failure to sue within twenty days of filing his
first notice.' 23 A more appropriate basis for reversal would have been the
court's opinion in City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 124 mandating that objections to the entry of summary judgment be presented to
the trial court. The high court was also on shaky ground when it tried to
distinguish American Employers Insurance Co. v. Scott, 25 which held the
date of a second notice filed in Austin to be dispositive. Because a board
rule permits only Austin filings,1 26 the court in Weinberg held that only the
127
Austin filing could satisfy the notice requirement.
Dual Requirement.: Filing and Prosecution. Two cases that reached the
courts of appeals involved the following dual requirement of article 8307,
section 5: "If any party to such final ruling and decision of the Board, after
having given notice as above provided, fails within said twenty (20) days to
institute and prosecute a suit to set the same aside, then said final ruling
and decision shall be binding .... ,"128 Both courts 129 relied upon Wilborn v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association,130 which reaffirmed the
rule that the dual requirement of both instituting and prosecuting a suit is
satisfied when a claimant files a petition within twenty days with a bona
fide intent that citation shall issue and be served at once or that waiver of
citation will be obtained and filed at once. In one of this year's cases,
Herrera v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, 13 1 satisfaction of the
requirement was established as a matter of law, as it was in Wilborn,132 by
a showing that the carrier had attempted service upon the claimant and
119. Weinberg v. American Gen. Fire & Cas. Co., 626 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1981) (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(n)).
120. 626 S.W.2d at 557.
121. The supreme court stated: "The Court of Appeals, obviously, considered this not

only to be error, but fundamental error requiring a reversal. Fundamental error has become
a rarity." 639 S.W.2d at 689.
122. Id.
123. Id.

124. 589 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Tex. 1979).
125. 33 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1930, writ ref'd).
126. Industrial Accident Bd., Rule 061.01.00.030, 2 Tex. Reg. 4315 (1977).

127. 639 S.W.2d at 689.
128. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1984).

129. Williams v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 653 S.W.2d 377, 378 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1983, writ refd n.r.e.); Herrera v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 653 S.W.2d 359, 360
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
130. 558 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
131. 653 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
132. 558 S.W.2d at 67.
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no fault of the carrier, but rather bethat such service had failed through
33
cause of the claimant's absence.
Limitations on Death Actions. Merrill v. Texas Employers' InsuranceAssociation 134 said more about summary judgment practice than about workers' compensation law. The court in Merritt reversed a summary judgment
against a widow who initiated her claim for death benefits more than six
months after her husband's death. The reason for the reversal, the court
announced, was the failure of the summary judgment movant to establish
its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, because a death benefits
claim becomes barred six months after death, not after injury, as the carrier had asserted in its motion. 35 It appeared that the court may have
used this technical ground to set aside the summary judgment in order to
allow the claimant's counsel to interpose the apparently available defense
to limitations that the decedent's employer did not file his E- 1 report of
injury until after the six-month period for filing for death benefits. 136
C

Pleadingand Special Issues

Affirmative Defenses. In but another warning of the waning utility of the
general denial, the supreme court in France v. American Indemnity Co. 137
reversed a take-nothing judgment against the claimant. France, a carpenter, injured his shoulder in 1975 while in the employ of American Indemnity's insured. In May 1977, while the claim arising out of the 1975 injury
was still pending, France reinjured his shoulder while lying in bed. His
physician advised him to undergo surgery but he chose not to do so. In
September he entered into a subsequently-approved compromise settlement agreement, whereby American Indemnity agreed to pay all future
medical benefits arising from the 1975 injury that France incurred prior to
March 30, 1978. On December 27, 1977, France suffered a third injury to
the shoulder while in the employ of Redford, a subcontractor under Home
Indemnity's insured. France then informed American Indemnity of his
desire to undergo surgery as previously advised, and American Indemnity
authorized the surgery. American Indemnity refused to pay for the surgery, however, when it learned that the precipitating dislocation occurred
while France was working on the Redford job. American Indemnity's adjuster suggested that France claim against Home Indemnity, his December
employer's carrier. France did so, but Home Indemnity denied liability on
the ground that France's employer, Redford, was a subcontractor of its
insured and that its coverage did not extend to Redford's employees.
France filed suit against American Indemnity on the settlement agreement
and received a favorable jury verdict. Nonetheless, the trial court held
133.
134.
135.
136.

Herrera, 653 S.W.2d at 361.
643 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
Id. at 744.
Id. at 742, 744. An E-I report is the employer's first report of injury. Id. at 742.

The employer in Merritt did not file such a report until Nov. 7, 1978. Id.
137. 648 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1983).
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that France had abandoned the settlement agreement. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment on the ground of election of remedies through
acts inconsistent with the assertion of rights under the settlement agreement.138 The supreme court disagreed with both lower courts, holding that
both abandonment of the settlement and election of remedies were affirmative defenses that American Indemnity had not raised in its general denial. 139 In a collateral matter the supreme court reversed the trial court's
determination as a matter of law that France was not entitled to attorneys'
carrier, holding that "[n]o
fees because of failure of "presentment" to the
140
particular form of presentment is required."'
Requirement of Pleading PartialIncapacity. The courts of appeal handed
down no fewer than four opinions emphasizing the very real pitfall heretofore facing claimants' attorneys in pleading incapacity. Mr. Nations has
described the difficulty:
In cases where a general injury may have caused both total and partial incapacity, the attorneys must be cognizant of the significance of
pleading these incapacities alternatively. The Texas Supreme Court
decision in Select Insurance Co. v. Boucher is illustrative. .

.

. The

clear effect of this holding is that a special issue as to partial incapacity may not be submitted to the jury unless presented as an alternative
ground of relief in the injured worker's petition. If there is any possibility of any degree of partial incapacity, the well advised claimant's
attorneys should plead and prove alternatively for total and partial
incapacity. 141
In International Insurance Co. v. Archuleta' 4 2 the supreme court removed much of the danger for claimants' counsel by holding that a
"pleading of total incapacity authorizes the submission of issue on partial
incapacity." 143 The court of appeals, relying on its understanding of Select
Insurance Co. v. Boucher, 44 had held the submission to be error. 4 5 The
high court distinguished Boucher:
In Boucher, the claimant pleaded and sought recovery for total and
permanent disability. Select, the carrier, pleaded and requested issues
on partial incapacity. This Court held that defensive issue of partial
incapacity is an inferential rebuttal issue and under Rule 277, Tex. R.
Civ. P., Select was not entitled to its submission. Submission of disjunctive issues on total incapacity and partial incapacity are appropriate iftwo alternativetheories of recovery are developed The issues, as
requestedby Select, constituted a defense and did not develop an alternative groundofrecovery. Select Ins. Co., this Court held, would have
138. Id. at 285. The opinion of the court of appeals was not published.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 286.
141. Nations, Pitfalls in Pleading a Workers' Compensation Casefor Claimants, 19 S.

TEX. L.J. 415, 425-26 (1978) (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
142. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 18 (Oct. 5, 1983).
143. Id. at 19.
144. 561 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1978).
145. 641 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982).
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been entitled to a definition of partial incapacity if requested in subthe issue on total
stantially correct form. The definition, given with
146
incapacity, would have preserved the defense.
This holding is formally consistent with the decision in United States Fire
Insurance Co. v. Monn ,'14 7 where the carrier urged error by the trial court
in refusing to submit its proposed definition of partial incapacity where the
claimant alleged only total and permanent incapacity. The court of appeals held it proper to refuse the submission where no affirmative written
pleading supported it. 148 Thus, a pleading of partial incapacity assures the
carrier's ability to obtain at least a definition. Under Archuleta, if developed at trial the pleading will entitle the carrier to an issue. On an unrelated point, the court also held that mention of insurance by the claimant's
reversible error when the insurer is a named
counsel was not necessarily
49
party to the suit. 1
The continuing wisdom of an alternative pleading of partial incapacity
is shown by Texas Employers'InsuranceAssociation v. Terry,150 decided by
the same court of appeals that wrote Archuleta. The Terry court observed:
Here, the claimant has obtained and retained employment probably
at a less strenuous job than he had before the injury and he is able to
perform the usual tasks of his employment on a full time basis at a
rate of pay in excess of that formerly received, and yet he has been
awarded a recovery for total and permanent disability. This was done
under a court's charge which presented the jury with no other alternative such as a possible finding of partial disability.' 5 '
It does not appear that the supreme court's holding in Archuleta would
alter the Terry result. The evidence in Terry was factually insufficient to
support the jury finding of total and permanent incapacity.
An illustration of the insurer's correct use of the defense of partial incapacity to a claim of total and permanent incapacity appeared in Texas GeneralIndemnity Co. v. Moreno .152 In Moreno the appeals court reversed on
the trial court's error in refusing a full and correct partial incapacity definition, when5 3 the insurer had properly pleaded and proved partial
incapacity.'
D.

Third Party Suits

The Texas Supreme Court settled an important question concerning the
role of the immune employer's negligence in a third party negligence ac146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
failure
Id.

27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 19-20 (emphasis added).
643 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 208.
Id. at 209-10.
656 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
Id. at 235.
638 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1982, no writ).
Id. at 908, 913-14. The court sustained a point of error raising the trial court's
to include a definition of "earning capacity" in its definition of "partial incapacity."
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tion, rejecting the holdings of two courts of appeals 154 that the employer's
negligence may be submitted to the jury and that the damages attributable
to it should be deducted, along with the damages attributable to the plaintiff's own negligence, from the damages found by the jury. The high court
in Varela v. American Petrofina Co. 15 5 held that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act created an exception to article
2212a, section 2(b) of the comparative negligence statute.' 56 The court
stated:
When read together those two Articles indicate the intent of the Legislature that where the third party defendant's negligence is greater than
that of the employee, the employee shall recover the total amount of
to the
damages as found by the jury diminished only in proportion
57
amount of the negligence attributed to the employee.
In a companion case, Teakell v. Perma Stone Co.,158 the court accordingly
held that it was proper for the trial court to59refuse to submit a special issue
to the jury on the employer's negligence.'
E. Attorneys' Fees
An attorney was allowed to keep his lump sum fee when a claimant
widow whom he represented in a death benefits case died after oral judgment but before the court signed a written judgment. Noting that it is the
oral decision that constitutes the judgment of the court, the court of appeals in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Woody160 also rested its decision
on a broader ground, stating:
It would be a harsh result to deny an attorney his fees for completed
services just because his client dies after judgment is rendered rather
than after the judgment has either become final or is affirmed. Section 7d does not require such a modification and in the present case
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not doing so. The statute
for the attorney to be awarded
only requires that the benefits accrue
16
his fees, not that they be enjoyed.
In Houston General Insurance Co. v. Metcalf 62 the court had to apportion attorneys' fees in a third party action in which the compensation carrier was actively represented by counsel. The fifth paragraph of article
8307, section 6a covers this situation. It provides for apportionment of an
aggregate fee of not more than one-third of the subrogated recovery based
154.

Varela v. American Petrofina Co., 644 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App.-Beaumont), rev'd,

658 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1983); Perma Stone Co. v. Teakell, 653 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.Corpus
155.
156.
157.
158.

Christi), rev'd, 658 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1983).
658 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1983).
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
658 S.W.2d at 562.
658 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1983).

159. Id. at 563.
160. 640 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).
161. Id. at 720. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7d (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides
that an attorney who represents the interest of a claimant from the board in the courts may
contract for a fee not to exceed 25% of the recovery, the fee to be fixed by the trial court.
162. 642 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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upon the benefit to the insurer from each attorney's representation. 163 The
court in Metcalf approved a division of a one-third fee so as to give twothirds of the fee to the claimant's counsel and one third to the carrier's
counsel. Thus, the carrier's attorney received only a one-ninth fee. The
court of appeals sustained the apportionment on points of factual insufficiency and abuse of discretion. The court stated:
We cannot say that the carrier would have had any recovery absent
[claimant's attorney's] efforts. Although appellant's attorney passively
refused to accept any lesser settlement on behalf of his client the legal
services performed by [claimant's attorney] were instrumental in the
carrier having an opportunity to recover any sum. The fact that
claimant's counsel initially requested the carrier to accept $20,000 [instead of the $42,715 later actually received] as his part of the total
recovery does not diminish the benefits to appellant of [claimant's attorney's] comprehensive services. Parenthetically, considering the
time involved, the actual services rendered and the lesser responsibility, an attorney's fee of $4,746 to carrier's counsel does not appear to
be inappropriate. 1 4
Finally, in Sunbelt Insurance Co. v. Childress 165 the court made clear that
attorneys' fees are not subject166to the statutory discount for present payment
announced in article 8306a.
F

Venue in Suits to Set Aside Board A wards

Article 8307, section 5, provides that suits to set aside final rulings or
decisions of the board may be brought by either party "in the county
where the injury occurred, or in the county where the employee resided at
the time the injury occurred ....,,167 Thus, when the parties appeal the
same board decision to courts in different counties, a race to the courthouse results. It had been predicted that this unsatisfactory situation
would be resolved by application of the first-in-time rule. 168 The court in
Andrews v. Utica Mutual InsuranceCo. 169 adopted this unsatisfactory resoand stated that the court of first filing obtained domlution to the situation
0
inant jurisdiction. 17
G. Prejudgment Interest
The court in HighlandInsurance Co. v. Martinez17' held that a claimant
who brings suit to recover unpaid benefits may receive prejudgment interest only on the portion representing weekly indemnity benefits and not on
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1984).
164. 642 S.W.2d at 80.
165. 640 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
166. Id. at 361; see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306a (Vernon 1967).
167. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
168. See F. SOUTHERS & T. KORIOTH, TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION DESK
183 (1980).
169. 647 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1982, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
170. Id. at 25-26.
171. 638 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).

163. TEX.
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the portion representing recovery for medical expenses. 172 The court relied on the language of the article 8306a proviso providing for four percent
interest "where suits are legally brought. . . and recovery is had for past
due weekly installments ..
173
III.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

The Sixty-Eighth Legislature enacted bills amending the Workers' Compensation Act in many particulars. The revisions are summarized below.
A.

Benefits and Attorneys' Fees

Funeral Benefits. The legislature increased allowable funeral benefits to
$2500. 174
Death Benefits. Three legislative changes affect death benefits. One clarifies a situation that could arise under former article 8306, section 8b.175
The preamendment provision provided that disability benefits paid to a
claimant during life should be deducted from any death benefit paid to his
beneficiaries, should death result from the compensable injury.' 7 6 The
amendment makes it clear that this offset operates only in the case of beneficiaries entitled to 360 weeks of benefits and not to beneficiaries entitled to
177
lifetime death benefits, namely spouses.
The legislature also addressed the significant conflict between the
facially different standards for the award of lump sum death benefits in
former article 8306, section 15178 and in article 8306, sections 8(b) and
8(d). 17 9 The amendment makes clear that sections 8(b) and 8(d) are restrictions on the board's power to award lump sum death benefits for
"manifest hardship" under section 15.180
In a significant change affecting the award of attorneys' fees in death
cases, the legislature clarified the definition of a "contested case." The
amendment indicates that a case is "contested," thereby triggering the
availability of attorneys' fees in a death case, if the carrier fails to admit
liability prior to final board action.181
B.

Penaltiesfor Late Payment of Benefits

In a major modification of the statutory framework, the legislature has
created a timetable for commencement or suspension of benefits and has
172. Id. at 510-11.
173. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306a (Vernon 1967) (emphasis added).
174. Id. art. 8306, § 9 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
175. Id. § 8b (Vernon 1967).

176. Id.
177. Id. § 8b (Vernon Supp. 1984).
178. Id. § 15 (Vernon 1967).

179. Id. § 8(b), (d) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
180. Id. § 15(b).

181. Id. § 8.
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added fines and penalties for failure to comply with the timetable.182 In
addition, the 1983 amendments provide for penalties against insurers who
83
"as a general business practice" delay or suspend payment of benefits.'

Specifically, the legislature added a new section 18a to article 8306. It requires that insurers and self-insurers either commence payments within
twenty days of receipt of notice of injury or "file with the Board a statement of controversion, or in claims of fatal benefits, a statement of position." 84 A penalty attaches for failure to meet this new requirement:
If the association or self-insured fails to initiate weekly indemnity
compensation or file a statement of controversion or statement of position within the allotted time, the Board shall notify the association
or self-insured in writing to its designated Austin Industrial Accident
Board representative of its possible violation of the Workers' Compensation Act. If within 10 days of receipt of such Board notice the
association or self-insured has still failed to either commence the payment of weekly indemnity benefits or to file a statement of controversion or in claims for fatal benefits, a statement of position, the Board
shall promptly set such claim for a prehearing conference on the merits and thereafter the Board after notice and hearing thereon, by majority vote, may assess a penalty not to exceed 15 percent of the
weekly indemnity compensation then past due.'8 5
A similar provision applies to suspension of weekly benefits or medical
86
benefits, leading again to the possibility of a fifteen percent penalty.1 87
The amended Act provides for attorneys' fees "as allowed by the Act,'
which presumably entitles the attorney to twenty-five percent of the fifteen
percent penalty. Larger penalties attach to conduct that the board finds to
be "a general business practice" of resisting lawful claims:
If it appears to the Board that the association, or self-insured, may be,
as a general business practice, controverting claims by reason of its
failure to promptly and adequately investigate such claims, or is controverting claims when the evidence then available clearly indicates
compensability, or is suspending the payment of weekly indemnity
compensation or medical benefits without stating fully in writing the
reasons therefore, the Board, after notice and hearing, may, upon a
finding by a majority of the members of the Board .

. . ,

issue [a

association or self-insured an
cease and desist order] or may fine the 88
amount not to exceed $10,000 or both.'
Appeals are de novo as in other cases. 189 In the "general business practice" penalty case, venue for the appeal lies solely in Travis County.' 90
A bill addressing disputes under a compromise settlement agreement
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. § 18a.
Id. § 18a(d).
Id. § 18a(a).
Id.
Id. § 18a(b).
Id. § 18a(c).
Id. § 18a(d).
Id. § 18a(e).
Id.
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was also enacted. 19 1 It provides that all disputes as to medical benefits
under compromise settlement agreements or agreed judgments "shall be
first presented by any party to the Industrial Accident Board within six
months from the time such dispute has arisen .... -192 The provision
expressly includes an exception for "good cause" and defines "dispute" as
occurring "when a written refusal of payment has been filed with the
board."' 193 In addition, the bill places a limitation period of four years
from the agreed expiration date upon a carrier's obligations for future
medical benefits under a compromise settlement agreement or agreed
94
judgment. 1
C Assignment of Benefits to Health Insurers
The exclusive remedy provision of the Act has been amended to allow
an assignment in favor of a health insurer who has paid compensable benefits.' 95 The Act now provides:
In the event the association denies liability in a claim and an accident
or health insurance company provides benefits to the employee for
medical aid, hospital services, nursing services or medicine, then the
by the employee to the
right to recover such amount may be assigned
196
health or accident insurance company.
D. Notice of Injury and Limitations
limit for
In a significant change, the legislature has extended the time
97
filing a claim for compensation from six months to one year.'
IndustrialAccident Board
98
A lengthy senate bill made numerous changes affecting the board.
The amendment's first section contains nondiscrimination provisions,
makes the board subject to the Sunset Act,' 99 seeks to assure neutrality of
board members, makes the board subject to the Open Meetings Act 2°° (except for prehearing conferences and hearings and determinations on
claims), and strengthens the board's enforcement powers over subscribers
who fail to make discovery. 20 ' Section two of the amending act mandates
the establishment by the board of internal procedures for promotion, merit
pay increases, and the assurance of nondiscrimination and equal opportunity. 20 2 In its third section the amendment clarifies the requirement of noE

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Act. of June 19, 1983, ch. 501, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2934.
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 12b (Vernon Supp. 1984).
Id.
Id.
Act of May 17, 1983, ch. 131, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 613, 614.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
Id. art. 8307, § 4a.
Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 483, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2815.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5429k (Vernon Supp. 1984).
Id. art. 6252-17.
Id. art. 8307, § Ia, 2, 4b.
Id. § 3a.
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tice to the board upon a subscriber's election of coverage and adds a
requirement of notification of a subscriber's change of address.

20 3

The Act

now backs up these notice requirements with the possibility of a five hun2 °4
dred dollar fine.
Finally, the bill's sixth section has amended the Act's treatment of medical services in two particulars. First, it makes clear that the carrier must
pay the cost of the medical reports that it requests and that the Act requires
to be furnished to the carrier. 205 The cost must be "fair and reasonable"
and no additional charge may be made for the provision of a copy to the
claimant or his attorney. 20 6 Second, the new law empowers the board to
create voluntary arbitration panels comprised of representatives of provider groups and the insurance industry to aid it in the regulation of compensable medical charges and fees. 20 7 Panel findings are not admissible
20 8
into evidence in a trial de novo.

A technical amendment harmonizes the provisions of sections 18a and
20a of article 8308. This amendment clarifies that the failure of an insurer
to give notice of cancellation or nonrenewal of subscriber coverage extends
the coverage until the cancelling carrier gives such notice pursuant to section 20a or until another carrier gives notice of new coverage under section
20 9
18a.
F

Subcontractors

The Sixty-Eighth Legislature has worked a considerable expansion of
the "statutory employer" provision of the Act. 210 Under prior law, a general contractor's liability for compensation to its subcontractor's injured
employees was limited. The general contractor became the "statutory employer" of the subcontractor's employees only if the general contractor
"with the purpose and intention of avoiding [compensation liability] sublets the whole or any part of [his work] to any sub-contractor .... -211
Under the new statute, the general contractor becomes the "statutory employer" of a subcontractor's employees if he agrees to do so in writing and
pays the compensation premiums himself.2 12 Although the current statute
states merely that "the subcontractor and his employees shall be considered employees of the prime contractor only for purpose of the workers'
compensation laws

. . .

and for no other purpose,

' 2 13

it is possible to infer

203. Id. art. 8308, § 18a.
204. Id. § 18a(b).
205. Id. art. 8306, § 7. The Act provides: "The failure of the physician or chiropractor
to make such reports or of the hospital to furnish requested records shall relieve the association and the injured worker from any obligation to pay for the services rendered .... " Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. art. 8308, § 20a.
210. Id. art. 8307, § 6 (Vernon 1967).
211. Id.
212. Id. § 6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
213. Id.
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that the legislature thereby conferred upon the prime contractor the tort
2 14
immunity created by article 8306, section 3.
G. Coverage
The legislature extended state employee coverage to district probation
department personnel. 215 Another enactment permits a political subdivision to elect workers' compensation coverage for delinquent children rendering personal services under the restitution program established under
section 54.041 of the Family Code. 2 16 Finally, the extraterritorial provision of the state employee workers' compensation act was amended to
make it clear that neither place of hiring nor performance of duties within
the state is determinative of state employee coverage under the Act. 2 17
H Second Injury Fund
An amendment has removed the monetary limits that formerly determined the obligation of carriers to pay death benefits into the Second In18
jury Fund. 2

214. Id. art. 8306, § 3(d) provides:
If an action for damages on account of injury to or death of an employee of a
subscriber is brought by such employee, or by [his] representatives ... against
a person other than a subscriber ... and if such action results in a judgment
against such other person, or results in a settlement by such other person, the
subscriber, his agent, servant or employee, shall have no liability to reimburse
or hold such other person harmless on such judgment or settlement, nor shall
the subscriber, his agent, servant or employee, have any tort or contract liability for damages to such other person . . . . in the absence of a written agreement expressly assuming such liability ....
See also 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 72.31-.31a (desk ed.
1983) (majority of cases hold general contractor who is made employer for purposes of compensation statute should have employer immunity from third party suit).
215. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 42.12, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
216. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309h, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1984); see TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. art. 54.041 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1983).
217. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309g, § 17 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
218. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 994, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5389, 5389-90 (codified at
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c-2 (Vernon Supp. 1984)).

